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EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020:
Are additional targets and instruments for renewables economically 
reasonable?1 
Abstract:
The European Council has proposed to stick to a more ambitious GHG target but to scrap a binding
RES target for the post-2020 period. This is in line with many existing assessments which demonstrate
that additional RES policies impair the cost-effectiveness of addressing a single CO2 externality, and 
should therefore be abolished. Our analysis explores to what extent this reasoning holds in a second­
best setting with multiple externalities related to fossil and nuclear power generation and policy
constraints. In this context, an additional RES policy may help to address externalities for which first­
best policy responses are not available. We use a fully integrated combination of two separate models ­
the top-down, global macro-economic model E3MG and the bottom-up, global electricity sector model
FTT:Power – to test this hypothesis. Our quantitative analysis confirms that pursuing an ambitious
RES target may mitigate nuclear risks and at least partly also negative non-carbon externalities
associated with the production, import and use of fossil fuels. In addition, we demonstrate that an 
additional RES target does not necessarily impair GDP and other macro-economic measures if rigid
assumptions of purely rational behaviour of market participants and perfect market clearing are
relaxed. Overall, our analysis thus demonstrates that RES policies implemented in addition to GHG
policies are not per se welfare decreasing. There are plausible settings in which an additional RES 
policy may outperform a single GHG/ETS strategy. Due to the fact, however, that i) policies may have 
a multiplicity of impacts, ii) the size of these impacts is subject to uncertainties and iii) their valuation
is contingent on individual preferences, an unambiguous, “objective” economic assessment is
impossible. Thus, the eventual decision on the optimal choice and design of climate and energy 
policies can only be taken politically.
Keywords:
Climate policy, energy policy, EU, emissions trading scheme, policy mix, renewables
JEL codes:
C53, Q42, Q43, Q48, Q54, Q58
1 Research for this publication was carried out in the context of the Helmholtz Alliance ENERGY-TRANS
“Future infrastructures for meeting energy demands. Towards sustainability and social compatibility”,
www.energy-trans.de.
  
 
   
 
     
   
   
   
           
   
     
     
      
  
    
      
 
 
  
         
 
   
     
     
     
   
   
  
     
    
   
  
   
     
 
  
  
       
  
  
           
    
    
   
            
         
          
      
    
                                                     
       
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 3
1 Introduction
The EU pursues a set of ambitious climate and energy targets for the year 2020: greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions shall be reduced by 20% compared to 1990 levels, the share of renewable energy
sources (RES) in total energy consumption shall be increased to 20%, and energy efficiency shall be
improved by 20% (European Commission, 2008). These targets are currently undergoing a process of
revision and updating for 2030. The European Council (2014) has agreed to maintain a differentiated
GHG target that is binding at the Member State level, and to tighten it to 40% at the overall EU level. 
The energy efficiency target shall be increased to 27%. The RES target is also slightly raised to 27%. 
Importantly, however, this target would not be binding anymore. First, this would be due to the fact
that the Council suggest not specifying the target on the Member State level. Second, the proposed
level of ambition would correspond to the RES share which is expected to be attained under the GHG
target anyway (European Commission, 2014). Thus, the European Council has in fact agreed to
abstain from a strong and credible RES target in the future. Our study aims to review this proposal
critically, particularly the decision to implement an only weak RES target in addition to the GHG
target.
The discussion on the 2030 targets can benefit from a large strand of economic studies which analyze 
the welfare effects of the EU 2020 targets, using computational general equilibrium (CGE) models
(Bernard and Vielle, 2009; Boeters and Koornneef, 2011; Böhringer et al., 2009a; 2009b; Kretschmer
et al., 2009), energy system optimization models (Aune et al., 2012; Capros et al., 2008; Capros et al.,
2011) or partial equilibrium models (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2011).2 These studies have been
complemented by analyses of post-2020 targets, including the recent assessment mandated by the
European Commission (2014) as well as others employing energy system models (Jägemann et al.,
2013; Möst and Fichtner, 2010; Unteutsch and Lindenberger, 2014). These studies consistently find
that an additional RES target leads to economic excess costs as it impairs the cost-effective attainment
of the GHG target. Yet, the decisive question is which policy recommendations can be derived on the
basis of this finding. An unambiguous plea to abolish a RES target and corresponding instruments can
only be made if (1) technology choice for electricity generation is only distorted by a GHG externality,
(2) the GHG externality is perfectly addressed by the GHG targets and instruments chosen, and (3)
there are no other policy objectives beyond efficient climate change mitigation. These restrictions are
acknowledged by most of the studies. Böhringer et al. (2011) point out, for example, that the excess
costs of a RES target may be interpreted as the “price tag […] for the composite of objectives different
from emission reduction.” This notwithstanding, these rationales are not further examined by the 
above strand of literature.
Our study aims to shed more light on the role of RES targets and instruments once the above
assumptions are relaxed. In particular, we consider a setting with multiple market failures - including
the GHG externality as well as technology market failures, other environmental externalities from
using fossil and nuclear fuels (e.g., air pollution, land use effects, nuclear hazards), and externalities
related to fossil fuel imports – which cannot efficiently be addressed by first-best policies for diverse 
reasons. In addition, we also take into account policy objectives that are beyond allocative efficiency
but may nevertheless be relevant for practical policy-making, such as job creation or decentralized
(“democratized”) energy supply. In such a setting RES targets and instruments may be justified if (1) 
they actually help to address the market failure or policy objective, and (2) they are more cost­
effective than other feasible policy approaches. For the purpose of our assessment, we first provide a 
review of possible benefits for using RES targets and instruments. Subsequently, we carry out a
quantitative assessment for three policy scenarios, including GHG policies only as well as additional
RES targets and instruments. This analysis provides an indication whether an additional RES policy
2 For a review, see also Tol (2012).
  
 
   
 
  
       
      
  
     
  
  
    
   
    
     
  
     
 
    
  
 
   
   
 
  
     
     
   
       
       
        
    
    
 
  
  
 
    
    
   
 
 
      
 
 
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 4
can actually better contribute to addressing diverse market failures and policy objectives than a stand­
alone GHG target and instrument.
To carry out our analysis, we employ the ‘E3MG-FTT:Power’ model. This model is a fully integrated
mix of two separate models, i.e. the top-down, global macro-economic model E3MG and the bottom­
up, global electricity sector model FTT:Power. In contrast to the CGE and energy system models
mentioned above, E3MG does not employ an optimization approach but rather simulates on the basis 
of actual behaviour observed in the past (represented by econometric specifications). Therefore, our
study may complement existing macro-economic analyses by relaxing some of their assumptions, such
as purely rational decision-making and market clearing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of possible benefits of
RES policies implemented in addition to a GHG policy. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4
introduces the policy scenarios. Model results are presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Benefits of additional RES targets and instruments – A review
For the purpose of our analysis, it is useful to distinguish three elements of policy design: objectives,
targets and instruments (see Figure 1). By objectives we refer to the rather general societal goals
associated with sustainable climate and energy policy. These include most prominently climate change
mitigation, environmental and resource conservation beyond climate change, technology development,
the security of energy supply, the promotion of green growth and green jobs and the decentralization
(or democratization) of energy supply (European Commission, 2011a). Targets are operationalized
and usually also quantified values which shall be attained in a certain period of time and are expected
to contribute to the overall objectives. In our analysis, we will focus on the RES-E target which
coexists with a GHG target for the EU ETS sectors. Finally, instruments are those measures which are 
implemented in order to actually attain the targets – and thereby also the objectives. We will restrict
our analysis to RES support schemes in the electricity sector which complement the EU ETS.
Existing assessments of RES targets and instruments relate additional costs primarily to benefits in
terms of climate change mitigation (see above). These kinds of benefits are null in a first-best setting
where a GHG externality is perfectly addressed by an ETS. However, there may be benefits if the 
assumptions of a single market failure and perfect policy responses as well as the focus on allocative
efficiency are relaxed. Correspondingly, three lines of arguments can be differentiated (see also Figure
1): (1) a first-best setting where the RES policy directly addresses market failure other than a GHG
externality, (2) a second-best setting where there are multiple market failures for which first-best
policy responses (targets and instruments) are either absent or insufficient for diverse institutional and
political constraints, and (3) a setting with policy objectives that go beyond mere allocative efficiency
and which may reflect a broader definition of the social welfare function, including, e.g., distributional
concerns. In the latter two settings, RES targets and instruments can be justified if they (1) actually
generate benefits in terms of correcting market failures or attaining policy objectives, and (2) if they
are more cost-effective than other institutionally and politically feasible policy options, including no 
(additional) policy intervention. 
When assessing these potential benefits of a separate RES target and instrument, it is important to
consider that the welfare losses from both market and policy failures mentioned above may be quite
significant in the long run as suboptimal investments in the electricity sector are perpetuated over
decades by strong socio-technical path dependencies (Kalkuhl et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2012; 
Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Neuhoff, 2005; Unruh, 2000).
  
 
   
   
   
  
  
  
 
   
      
   
        
           
  
   
    
   
  
    
    
  
  
  
      
 
    
 
 
         
                                                     
  
           
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 5
The discussion in this section is not meant to assess whether or not an additional RES target and
instrument is actually welfare-increasing – nor what the optimal level of such target would be. Instead,
it aims to broaden the perspective on which costs and benefits should be taken into account when
assessing RES policies.
Figure 1: Possible economic rationales for RES targets and instruments in the electricity sector
It is usually assumed that the rationales for implementing a separate RES target and a separate RES
instrument are basically the same. In addition, it has also been shown analytically that a mix of
emission reduction and RES deployment targets can only be achieved simultaneously and cost­
effectively by a mix of an emissions policy and a technology policy (Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Pethig
and Wittlich, 2009). On the one hand, one may presume that this reasoning also holds in the second­
best setting described in the following where multiple externalities and objectives are to be attained by
the GHG and RES target. In order to address the externalities, technology substitution is required,
which may be attained more effectively by a technology policy than by an emissions policy. On the
other hand, tightening the EU ETS may also help to correct (some of) the externalities. However, this
technology-neutral approach would likely induce excessive abatement by other options beyond 
deploying RES and therefore bring about higher societal costs than an instrument mix. We will
explore this policy instrument issue in detail by our quantitative analysis.
2.1 First-best setting: Additional technology market failures
In a first-best setting, the GHG emissions externality is assumed to be properly addressed by the ETS.
In this case, an additional RES target may be justified in the presence of additional technology market
failures, most notably positive externalities related to learning-by-doing with RES technology 
deployment. These externalities arise because firms learn to optimize products and production
processes as their cumulative output increases, and this knowledge may at least partly spill over to
other market competitors (for overviews, see Bennear and Stavins, 2007; Fischer and Newell, 2008; 
Jaffe et al., 2005; Lehmann, 2012, 2013; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013). Quantitative evidence on the
existence of such externalities for RES technologies is still not available.3 However, anecdotal
3 There is increasing evidence on knowledge spillovers associated with research and development of renewable
energy technologies (Bjørner and Mackenhauer, 2013; Braun et al., 2010; Dechezlepretre et al., 2013; Garrone et
  
 
   
  
 
   
     
        
  
   
  
     
   
  
 
   
  
  
     
            
       
 
   
    
       
  
  
    
              
  
  
        
  
      
         
   
    
    
   
     
   
    
  
      
           
  
   
                                                                                                                                                                      
       
          
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 6
evidence for the RES sector (Hansen et al., 2003; IEA, 2000; Junginger et al., 2005; Neij, 1999) as 
well as experience with non-renewable energy technologies (Lester and McCabe, 1993; Zimmerman,
1982) and the manufacturing sector in general (Argote and Epple, 1990; Irwin and Klenow, 1994)
seem to suggest that learning spillovers may characterize RES deployment also. The potential welfare 
effects from learning spillovers may be particularly high in the energy sector, as it is characterized by
long-term investments with strong path dependencies and lock-in effects (Goldthau and Sovacool,
2012; Kalkuhl et al., 2012). Thus, policy intervention would be more warranted in the energy sector
than in other sectors where similar externalities tend to occur as well.
In the presence of positive externalities associated with learning-by-doing in RES technologies, targets
and instruments to promote RES deployment are justified. Depending on how the learning process is
modelled, a GHG policy has to be supplemented by a technology-specific subsidy to either (i) RES-E 
generation (Canton and Johannesson Lindén, 2010; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Kalkuhl et al., 2012; 
Lehmann, 2013), (ii) renewable generation capacity installed (van Benthem et al., 2008), (iii)
investments in renewable generation capacity (Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007), or (iv) output of
manufacturers of RES-E installations (Bläsi and Requate, 2010).
2.2 Second-best setting I: Imperfect internalization of the GHG externality
It may be unclear whether the current GHG targets (20% reduction by 2020, 40% reduction by 2030) 
and even more ambitious long-term targets are efficient, given the large uncertainties surrounding the
costs and benefits of GHG emission reductions (for a sceptical view, see, e.g., Tol, 2012). However,
the picture becomes clearer if an ambitious long-term target of 80% emissions reduction by 2050 is
accepted as a reasonable target. A model comparison by Knopf et al. (2013) shows that in this case the 
2020 GHG target is not ambitious enough, while the 2030 target seems to be in line with cost-effective 
pathways for achieving the 2050 target. 
Even if the targets are set properly, the attainment of these targets will be questionable given the
current design of climate policy instruments. Knopf et al. (2013) point out that the trajectory agreed 
upon for the reduction of the emissions cap under the EU ETS (1.74% annually) is clearly below the
levels needed to actually achieve short- and long-term targets.  This does not come as a surprise as the
cap as well as other design features of the EU ETS have been the result of a political bargaining
process – rather than some cost-benefit analysis (Anger et al., 2008; Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; 
Rudolph, 2009; Skodvin et al., 2010). In addition, the carbon price signal generated by the EU ETS
exhibits major short- and long-term uncertainties. Against this background, the EU ETS fails to set 
sufficient incentives to switch to low-carbon technologies which are needed to attain the long-term 
targets cost-effectively (for overviews, see Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Matthes, 2010). Under these
conditions, an additional RES policy may serve as a second-best strategy to mitigate climate change
cost-effectively in the long run (Bläsi and Requate, 2007; Fischer, 2008; Ulph and Ulph, 2010). 
Obviously, the first-best approach would always be to strengthen the EU ETS. This appears to be
particularly warranted as RES deployment may bring about significantly higher societal costs than if
the policy failures were addressed directly (Borenstein, 2012; Kalkuhl et al., 2013). However, given
the past experience with politico-economic decision-making, it is unclear whether the EU ETS 
emissions cap will actually be reduced to the levels that would be necessary to attain the targets. 
Moreover, Gawel et al. (2014) show that a separate RES policy may have another advantage in this
respect. As RES targets are typically implemented by subsidies, they bring down abatement costs for
participants under the EU ETS. These may therefore be willing to accept stronger emissions
reductions. Thus, a separate RES target may also help to negotiate a tighter emissions cap.
al., 2010; Popp and Newell, 2012). However, such externalities cannot be properly addressed by general RES
deployment targets, but rather by more specific RES-R&D targets and policies.
  
 
   
 
          
  
       
  
  
 
   
  
  
       
      
    
   
  
 
              
      
   
  
           
 
     
    
  
    
    
 
  
    
        
  
 
 
        
    
        
      
  
    
     
       
 
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 7
2.3 Second-best setting II: Imperfect internalization of other externalities
A separate RES target can also be understood as a second-best policy to address externalities beyond
GHG emissions if these cannot be corrected directly by appropriate first-best approaches  (Edenhofer
et al., 2013b; Edenhofer et al., 2013c; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; McCollum et al., 2011). This type
of rationale will be discussed in the following for the two most prominent examples: additional
environmental externalities associated with the use of fossil and nuclear fuels and externalities arising
from the import of fossil fuels.
Fossil and nuclear fuels also produce environmental externalities other than climate change. For fossil
fuels, these may be related to damages from fuel extraction (e.g., ecological impacts of open cast coal
mining and fracking), transportation (e.g., oil spills), and combustion (e.g., local air pollution) (e.g.,
Epstein et al., 2011). Similarly, there are hazards associated with the operation of nuclear power plants 
and the final storage of nuclear wastes (Heyes and Heyes, 2000). These externalities are typically not
addressed perfectly by Pigovian tax-like policies. If such externalities are produced by economic 
activities within the territory of the EU, the absence of direct policies for internalization may be 
explained by lacking political will (in order to reduce the burden for voters or interest groups). Yet,
externalities reducing welfare within the EU may also be related to economic activities outside the EU.
Examples include the inter-regional transportation of pollutants or radioactivity by air and ocean
currents or the loss of biodiversity. In such cases, the lack of regulation is simply due to the fact that
externalities arise beyond the legislative scope of the EU. In both cases, the promotion of RES
deployment may help to substitute fossil and nuclear fuels for electricity generation and control
externalities indirectly (IPCC, 2011; McCollum et al., 2011; Siler-Evans et al., 2013). Certainly, the
actual extent of benefits from RES deployment needs to be assessed with care. First of all, it depends
on which types of non-renewable power plants are drawn out of the market and where (Borenstein,
2012). Second, there may be interactions between RES and GHG policies. Under a fixed CO2 cap,
increasing the share of renewable energy sources may drive down the CO2 price (for an overview, see
Lehmann and Gawel, 2013). As a consequence, emitters which are subject to the cap but outside the
electricity sector may increase production and generate additional environmental externalities. Finally,
RES may produce new types of environmental externalities, such as land use conflicts associated with
the installation of wind turbines and biomass production or negative impacts on aquatic ecosystems
related to the use of hydropower (IPCC, 2011; Kerr, 2010). 
Fossil fuels may also generate externalities in terms of security of energy supply if they are imported 
from politically unstable regions. Sudden supply interruptions may significantly impair importing 
economies (Borenstein, 2012; Johansson et al., 2012). Estimating these external costs is certainly
difficult (see, e.g.,  Bohi and Toman, 1996; Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010). In theory, such
externalities could be corrected directly by tariffs on imported fuels. The ubiquitous lack of such 
policies may be attributed to the fact that they would oftentimes violate international trade law and
may raise political fears of economic sanctions imposed by exporting countries. Against this
background, promoting domestic RES to substitute imported fossil fuels may produce benefits in
terms of safeguarding the security of supply (McCollum et al., 2011). For electricity generation in the
EU, such benefits will primarily arise if natural gas imports from Russia or Northern Africa are
substituted (Borenstein, 2012; Edenhofer et al., 2013a). In a theoretical model, Böhringer and
Rosendahl (2010, 2011) confirm that a RES policy in fact reduces the share of electricity generation
from natural gas. Certainly, the use of RES may also produce new problems of security of supply due
to their intermittency.
  
 
   
 
   
 
     
      
          
       
        
 
 
 
     
   
          
      
 
 
 
    
        
   
 
  
    
      
    
    
  
    
        
     
  
    
  
     
 
 
 
       
       
   
     
  
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 8
2.4 Second-best setting III: Direct subsidies to fossil and nuclear fuels
The use of non-renewable energy technologies is also supported directly. This includes subsidies to
fuel production and consumption as well as to technology research and development (Ellis, 2010; 
IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank, 2010; OECD, 2011). These subsidies reduce the cost of non­
renewable energy sources to inefficiently low levels. Obviously, the first-best solution would again be
to abolish the subsidies. However, this may be difficult politically due to opposition from affected
mining companies, plant manufacturers and energy utilities, as well as from consumers facing higher
electricity prices. Against this background, a RES policy is again a means to establish a level playing
field for technology decisions in the electricity sector.
2.5 Objectives beyond allocative efficiency
In the political arena, RES targets are associated with multiple objectives to be attained. Some of them
– such as climate change mitigation, environmental and resource conservation and security of supply –
may be justified on the basis of allocative efficiency in first- or second-best settings, as they have been
outlined in the previous sections. However, there are also policy objectives associated with RES
targets – such as green jobs and green growth or the decentralization of energy supply – which may be 
more difficult to relate to improvements in allocative efficiency or the correction of a market failure.
Nevertheless, this finding does not imply that such objectives should be disregarded in economic
analyses for at least two reasons: First, these objectives may be highly relevant for practical decision­
making. For example, RES policies may only be politically feasible if they also address concerns of
employment (Edenhofer et al., 2013b). Analyses neglecting this kind of objectives risk running into a
nirvana approach (Demsetz, 1969). Second, the existence of such objectives may also reflect societal
preferences beyond allocative efficiency, such as justice, fairness or participation. These may be
revealed in a political process of elections and influences from different interest groups (Oates and
Portney, 2003) – even though this process is certainly subject to manifold distortions (e.g., Olson,
1965). In these cases, the primary question is not so much whether the objective makes sense 
economically but rather whether they can be attained cost-effectively by a RES policy.
The most prominent objective in this realm is the stimulation of green growth and green jobs. It will
be a hard test to show that this objective can be justified on the basis of market failures, such as 
imbalances in the labour market (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010). This notwithstanding, RES policies
have certainly promoted gross growth and employment in green industry sectors, such as RES 
manufacturing. O’Sullivan et al. (2013) estimate that Germany’s RES policy has generated 268,000
jobs in RES industry sectors by 2012. Certainly, this comes at the cost that economic development in
other economic sectors may be impaired, such that net effects may be quite different. Borenstein
(2012) points out that one has to distinguish between a short-term stimulus objective and a longer-term 
objective of job creation. Creutzig et al. (2013) argue that a European energy transition could have a
positive stimulus effect, primarily because RES investments involve large upfront construction costs.
In contrast, empirical evidence on net job effects of RES policies is very mixed involving negative as
well as positive assessments (EWI et al., 2004; Hillebrand et al., 2006; Lehr et al., 2008; Rivers, 2013; 
Wei et al., 2010). On the one hand, RES technologies are more labour-intensive for producing energy 
than the non-renewable technologies they substitute (Borenstein, 2012). On the other hand, RES
policies which are refunded by increases in electricity prices (or taxes) crowd out investments
elsewhere in the economy (Frondel et al., 2008; Frondel et al., 2010). Thus, using RES policies to
promote green growth and employment may be quite costly, which also raises the question whether
other available means – such as macroeconomic fiscal and monetary or wage policies – could be more
cost-effective in attaining the target. 
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RES policies are also expected to contribute to a more distributed generation of electricity which is 
associated with a fairer distribution of, and participation in, the benefits of electricity generation
(Alanne and Saari, 2006; Pepermans et al., 2005). Empirical observations seem to confirm this 
expectation. In Germany, for example, almost half the RES-E capacity installed in 2012 was owned by 
private individuals, farmers and cooperatives (Trend Research/Leuphana, 2013). Of course, the
eventual magnitude of such benefits depends crucially on the specific design of the RES policy,
particularly on how investment risks are mitigated (for a discussion, see Lehmann et al., 2012).
2.6 Interim conclusion
The discussion in this section has revealed that there may be multiple benefits from implementing
RES targets and instruments in addition to a GHG target and instrument. Economic studies so far rely 
on a problem framework tackling a single climate-related externality through a perfect ETS
instrument, in which additional RES policies indeed create additional costs but no added value. If we 
relax the underlying assumptions in order to analyse energy policies in a more reality-oriented
framework we have to take into account (1) additional, non-climate externalities of energy provision, 
(2) imperfections of instruments under real-life conditions and (3) policy objectives beyond allocative
efficiency touching upon other politically relevant societal concerns. If multiple market failures have
to be addressed using imperfect instruments, as it is the case in the real world, additional RES policies
can create social benefits compared to a stand-alone ETS policy. These benefits are economically
relevant from an efficiency perspective, whereas “political” benefits from different objectives (3)
usually are considered irrelevant (political “co-benefits”, see Edenhofer et al. (2013b)).
Moreover, it has become obvious that an objective assessment of all costs and benefits of an additional
RES policy is nearly impossible. First, the assessment of costs and benefits is impaired by underlying
uncertainties and complexities. Second, it eventually always hinges on the value judgments, risk
preferences and ethical considerations of individuals or groups of individuals. In this respect,
economic analyses of possible benefits and costs under certain assumptions can be used to inform
political decision-makers. Yet, the final decision on whether or not a certain policy target makes sense
– given possibly additional benefits but also possibly additional costs – can only be taken by the
political decision-maker. This has been pointed out for the setting of GHG targets (IPCC, 2014; Knopf
and Geden, 2014) – but it equally applies to the setting of (additional) RES targets (Lehmann et al., 
2014).
Since social benefits of RES supporting policies are likely under real-world conditions, economic
analysis should not only assess possible excess costs in fulfilling the single climate target. Rather, the
analysis ought to compare the overall economic performance of energy policies under different
scenarios with or without separate RES targets and instruments reflecting multiple externalities and
imperfections of instruments in a second-best framework. Therefore, the subsequent model analysis 
will shed light on the cost and benefits that arise under such policy scenarios. The idea of this analysis
is not to determine a specific cost-benefit ratio, which would indicate whether a certain policy (mix) is 
economically justified. It is neither meant to identify certain optimal characteristics of policy design,
such as an efficient level of a RES target. Instead it is meant to provide an indication whether and to
what extent additional RES policies may generate benefits beyond that of climate change mitigation. 
Such benefits would need to be put into relation to the often emphasized excess costs of an additional
RES policy.
3 Model
To carry out a quantitative assessment of benefits and costs of different policy scenarios – including
GHG policies only as well as additional RES targets and instruments – we use the so-called ‘E3MG-
  
 
   
    
  
 
    
  
  
   
   
  
    
  
 
     
   
 
    
          
     
 
 
   
  
  
  
    
 
  
 
 
  
    
  
 
                                                     
     
       
      
    
   
        
    
    
      
  
     
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 10
FTT:Power’ model. This model is a fully integrated mix of two separate models, i.e. the top-down,
global macro-economic model E3MG and the bottom-up, global electricity sector model FTT:Power. 
The characteristics of these two models and their differences to existing approaches to analyze the EU
framework for climate and energy policy are described in the following.4 
3.1 The E3MG model
The E3MG model (Energy-Environment-Economy Model at the Global level) is a computer-based
tool that has been constructed by international teams led by Cambridge Econometrics and the
University of Cambridge. The model is econometric in design and is capable of addressing issues that
link developments and policies in the areas of energy, the environment and the economy. The essential
purpose of the model is to provide a framework for policy evaluation, particularly policies aimed at
achieving sustainable energy use over the long term.5 However, the econometric specification that the
model uses also allows for an assessment of short-term transition effects.
In terms of basic accounting structure, purpose and sectoral and regional coverage, there are many
similarities between E3MG and comparable CGE models, such as GTAP (Hertel, 1999). However, the
modelling approaches differ substantially in their treatment of behavioural relationships and the
structure of markets. CGE analyses pursue an optimization approach. They typically assume purely
rational behaviour of agents with perfect knowledge and foresight. Price adjustments provide for
equilibria in all markets, including the labour market. In contrast, E3MG is an econometric model
which predicts agents’ behaviour on the basis of historical data sets. Thus, E3MG does not assume 
optimal behaviour. The price is set by mark-up principle and the wage is determined by the wage­
bargaining process between employers and employees. These differences have important implications 
for the possible model results. In CGE models, all resources are fully utilized. Therefore, it is not
possible to raise output or employment by government interventions. In E3MG, potentially existing
market disequilibria with unused capital and labour resources may allow for regulation to increase
investment, output and employment. Thus, E3MG may provide a more realistic assessment of policy 
performance as it does not depend on the rigid assumptions of CGE models. The major drawback of
the E3MG approach is that it hinges on the quality of the time series data sets (Bosetti et al., 2009; 
Cambridge Econometrics, 2014; Jansen and Klaassen, 2000). Moreover, this approach rests on the
assumption that past behaviour can be employed to predict future trends, even under different policy 
regimes.
The current version of E3MG covers 22 world regions, although in this analysis we focus solely on the
EU. The basic structure of E3MG is presented in Figure 2. The model integrates energy demand and 
emissions with the economy; fuel demand is determined by prices and economic activity, with
feedback through the energy supply sectors. Energy combustion results in greenhouse gas emissions.
For further details, see the websites of these models, www.e3mgmodel.com and
http://www.4cmr.group.cam.ac.uk/research/FTT/fttpower, as well as the references mentioned there.
5 E3MG has been employed for policy analysis at European level, including the 2010 European Commission
communication on the impacts of moving to a 30% GHG target (European Commission, 2010a). The model has
also been used repeatedly for assessing decarbonisation pathways at different international levels (Barker et al.,
2008; Barker et al., 2005, 2006; Barker and Scrieciu, 2009) and in the UK (Dagoumas and Barker, 2010). More
recently, E3MG was applied in Barker et al. (2012) to provide an economic assessment of the IEA’s 450ppm
scenario (IEA, 2010). In Japan, E3MG has been applied for an assessment of the economic costs of meeting 
Japan’s  Copenhagen pledge of reducing GHG emissions by 25% below 1990 level by 2020 (Lee et al., 2012).
Most recently, E3MG has been used for an economic and environmental assessment of future electricity
generation mixes in Japan (Pollitt et al., 2014).
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Figure 2: E3 interactions with E3MG
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (2014).
The economic module in E3MG contains a full representation of the National Accounts, as formulated
by Stone (1951), and formally presented in European Communities et al. (2009). A key feature of
E3MG is its sectoral disaggregation, with 42 economic sectors, linked by input-output relationships;
this aspect is particularly important in modelling carbon policies, because the different sectors use 
different fuels in varying degrees of intensity and have different technological options for changing
consumption patterns.
E3MG’s treatment of energy demand is largely top-down in nature. Econometric equations are
estimated for aggregate energy demand and demand for the four main fuel types (coal, fuel oil, natural
gas, electricity). Energy demand, for 22 different user groups, is a function of economic activity,
relative prices and measures of technology. The model solves all equations simultaneously and adjusts 
the individual fuels to sum to the total for each user. Feedbacks to the economy are provided by 
adjusting input-output coefficients and household energy demand.
Emissions are estimated using a fixed coefficient to fuel demand. Non-energy emissions are included
in the model so that global totals are met, but are treated as exogenous in this paper.
E3MG includes endogenous measures of sectoral technological progress. The indices used in the
model are functions of accumulated capital, enhanced by R&D, an approach adapted from Lee et al. 
(1990). Endogenous technological progress is allowed to influence several of the model’s equation
sets, including energy demand, international trade, price formation and the labour market.
As an econometric model with sectoral detail, E3MG requires extensive data inputs. A large time­
series database covering each year from 1970 to 2010 has been constructed, based mainly on 
international data sets. Any gaps in the data are filled by using national figures. The main cross­
sectional data (the input-output table and bilateral trade flows) are sourced from the OECD. The main
source for energy data is the IEA. CO2 emissions have also been made consistent with IEA figures.
E3MG consists of 22 estimated sets of equations (each disaggregated by sector and by country). These 
cover the components of GDP, prices, the labour market and energy demand. The estimation method 
  
 
   
 
   
            
      
  
 
           
   
 
  
 
  
   
     
      
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
     
   
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
    
 
       
   
         
 
  
 
 
    
   
 
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 12
utilises developments in time-series econometrics, in which dynamic relationships are specified in
terms of error correction models (ECM) that allow dynamic convergence to a long-term outcome.
The specific functional form of the equations is based on the econometric techniques of cointegration
and error-correction, particularly as promoted by Engle and Granger (1987) and Hendry et al. (1984). 
In brief, the process involves two stages. The first-stage is a levels relationship, whereby an attempt is
made to identify the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the chosen variables, selected on
the basis of economic theory and a priori reasoning, e.g. for employment demand the list of variables
contains real output, real wage costs, hours-worked, energy prices and a measure of technological
progress. If a cointegrating relationship exists, then the second stage regression is known as the error­
correction representation, and involves a dynamic, first-difference, regression of all the variables from
the first stage, along with lags of the dependent variable, lagged differences of the exogenous
variables, and the error-correction term (the lagged residual from the first stage regression).
3.2 The FTT:Power model
FTT:Power is a simulation model of  technology diffusion in the electricity sector globally (Mercure,
2012). As opposed to many contemporary models (see, e.g., Messner and Strubegger (1995) for the
MESSAGE model and Seebregts et al. (2001) for the MARKAL model), it does not solve a cost­
optimisation problem in order to model investor decisions and the composition of the electricity 
sector. FTT:Power is composed of a decision-making model for power sector investors at the firm
level, evaluating decisions made by a diverse distribution of investors influenced by cost and policy
considerations. It uses pairwise comparisons of options at the investor level using a stochastic 
description of component costs, based on 24 technologies in 22 E3MG regions. It includes cost
dynamics such as learning-by-doing and natural resource cost-supply curves (Mercure and Salas,
2012), as well as a dynamic model of non-renewable energy commodity price dynamics (Mercure and
Salas, 2013). 
Observed historical diffusion of innovations follows a well-known pattern (e.g., Grübler et al., 1999), 
which is missed out by cost-optimisation models, the latter not featuring the necessary theoretical
underpinning. When contemplating the energy industry, it may be intuitively expected that well
established firms with their preferred established technologies and existing technical expertise may be 
better able to expand in a changing market than small and emerging enterprises selling new
technology, despite price considerations. This must be reflected in diffusion rates produced by any 
model. This is also a reflection of the enduring nature of technology regimes and technical expertise
(e.g., Geels, 2002). Given a certain production capacity for new units of particular technologies, power
sector investors wishing to venture into projects involving new technologies may be constrained by the
availability of technology producers despite their investment preferences. Given these constraints and
dynamics, the technology composition of a real system may not always be near the solution of a cost­
optimisation calculation.
These considerations are encompassed in a model of technology diffusion, which must, as an output,
produce diffusion patterns consistent with empirical observations. This is the fundamental principle
underpinning FTT:Power, in which the cost-optimisation driver (the social planner) of investor
decisions in common models is replaced by a decision-making model at the investor level. Firms and
technologies are assumed to expand or shrink proportionally to their own market share, which leads to
a dynamic differential equation description of technology substitutions. In the special case of the 
competition between two technologies, this produces the archetypical logistic diffusion curve, while
when more technologies interact, many possible patterns can emerge. The rate of diffusion is
constrained by the rate of adoption as well as the lifetime and expansion time constants of the
producers. This theory is described in detail in Mercure (2012).
  
 
   
  
      
  
 
   
   
  
  
 
  
    
 
    
 
   
   
 
 
  
 
  
         
    
   
     
  
       
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 13
The advantage of using a decision-making model instead of an optimisation procedure is immediate:
in a decision-making model one is in principle able to simply include cost considerations to investors
originating from policy (e.g. carbon costs, RES-E subsidies, capital cost subsidies) that influence their
decisions. This enables the model to explore the effectiveness of policy instruments, in isolation and in 
combination, to foster technology diffusion, which occurs at a rate reflecting both technology uptake
and technology replacement. In an earlier study we found that, in such a modelling context, strong
synergies exist between policy instruments (Mercure et al., 2013), where for instance the effectiveness
of a carbon price in fostering the uptake of renewables strongly depends on the full renewables policy
context including RES-E subsidies. We find a similar process occurring in the present study.
The FTT model has been fully integrated to the E3MG model with two-ways feedbacks between each
of the E3 modules of E3MG. Figure 3 summarises these links.
Figure 3: FTT links to E3MG
(PG – power generators)

Source: (Cambridge Econometrics, 2014).
 
4 Scenarios
We apply the E3MG-FTT:Power Model to provide a quantitative assessment of potential costs and
benefits of implementing a RES policy in addition to a GHG policy. For this purpose, we aim to
compare the model results for four scenarios (one baseline and three policy scenarios):
•	 A baseline scenario where the currently existing 2020 GHG and RES policies are maintained but
not tightened beyond 2020 (S0 – baseline);
•	 A scenario where a more ambitious 2030 GHG target is set for the EU ETS sector and attained by
a tightened EU ETS cap (S1 – CO2/ETS only);
•	 A scenario where the 2030 GHG target is complemented by a RES-E target, and both are attained
only by means of a further tightened EU ETS cap (S2 – CO2+RES/ETS only);
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•	 A scenario where the 2030 GHG and RES-E targets are attained by a policy mix of the EU ETS
and a strengthened RES support scheme (S3 – CO2+RES/policy mix).
This section introduces the basic assumptions underlying all scenarios and specifies the characteristics
and rationales of the baseline and policy scenarios. Table 1 provides an overview of the scenarios. The 
upper section represents the policy assumptions which we have set for our scenario analysis. The
lower section provides the policy characteristics as they result from our model simulation.
Table 1: Overview of scenarios
S1 S2 S3
S0 (baseline) (CO2/ (CO2+RES/ (CO2+RES/ 
ETS only) ETS only) policy mix)
Policy assumptions
2030 GHG target for the EU ETS 
sectors
2030 RES-E target (%)
No
No
Yes
(1136 
MtCO2)
No
Yes
(1136 
MtCO2)
Yes
(40%)
Yes
(1136 
MtCO2)
Yes
(40%)
EU ETS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology-neutral RES subsidy
Policy specifications and outcomes 
according to model simulations
Yes As in S0 As in S0 Higher than in S0
ETS cap (MtCO2) in 2030 1512 1136 626 1136
CO2 price in 2030 (in 2010 prices) 33 100 440 52
RES-E share (%) in 2030 26 32 40 40
Average RES-E subsidy over all
electricity produced in 2030 (€/MWh)
Average RES-E subsidy per MWh of 
RES-E generated (€/MWhRES-E)
2.0
7.7
1.2
3.8
0.16
0.4
7.2
18.1
4.1 Common basic scenario assumptions and input variables
The main assumptions and input variables for all scenarios analysed in the present paper include:
•	 GDP/sectoral growth rates: for the EU region, assumptions on the baseline GDP/sectoral growth
rates up to 2030 have been derived from and calibrated to DG ECFIN’s economic projections up
to 2030 in the 2012 Aging Report (European Commission (2012), see the upper part of Table 2).
For all other, non-EU regions, these growth rates are obtained from the IEA’s baseline or ‘Current
Policies Scenario’ published in its World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA, 2012);
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•	 Fuel prices: assumptions on fuel prices up to 2030 are also derived from the IEA’s ‘Current
Policies Scenario’ in its WEO 2012 (IEA (2012); see the lower part of Table 2);
Table 2: Key scenario assumptions on economic growth rates and fuel prices, 2010-2030 
Baseline growth rates 
(average % per annum) 2010-2020 2020-2030
EU27 GDP 1.4% 1.6%
Industry 1.2% 1.6%
Transport 1.1% 0.9%
Services 1.6% 1.7%
Fuel prices 2020 2030
Oil (2011$/barrel) 128.3 141.1
Gas (2011$/MBtu) 12.1 13.4
Coal (2011$/tonne) 115.0 125.0
Sources: European Commission (2010b, 2012) and IEA (2012).
•	 Climate policies outside the EU: in all scenarios, we have assumed that countries outside the EU
take no action beyond their existing policies and GHG reduction targets that already are in place in
the baseline (as in the Current Policies scenario from the IEA WEO 2012 publication). There are
some feedbacks from countries outside the EU in the scenario through trade competitiveness.
However, the EU climate target alone will not have significant impacts on global energy demand.
This implies that, in all scenarios, international energy/commodity prices are assumed to be the
same;
•	 Allocation of EU emission allowances (EUAs): for reasons of simplicity, it is assumed in our
modelling scenarios that, starting from 2013, all EUAs for the power sector are auctioned and all
EUAs for the other (industrial) sectors are allocated for free on a lump sum basis (i.e. not related
to current or updated production).6 Therefore, using these free allowances is regarded as spending
so-called ‘opportunity costs’ and, hence, these costs are passed on to higher output prices,
depending on the demand responsiveness, competitiveness and other market conditions of the
industries concerned;
•	 Banking and borrowing of EUAs: we have assumed no borrowing, but banking is allowed as long
as the 2030 emission target (1,136 MtCO2) is met;
•	 Revenues from EUA auctioning of the power sector: assumed to be recycled through lump-sum 
allocations to households, which increase their wealth rather than their direct consumption level.
For some scenarios, however, we have conducted a sensitivity analysis in which we have assumed
6 In reality, however, allocation is more complicated as the power sector in ten Eastern European countries is
allowed to receive a (declining) share of its EUAs for free while some industries – not regarded to be exposed to
the risk of carbon leakage – have to buy a (growing) share of their EUAs at an auction. For specific details on
EUA allocation issues, see the website of the DG CLIMA (European Commission, 2013a).
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that half of the EUA auction revenues is recycled to households through lump-sum allocation
(increasing their wealth), and the other half through lowering their direct income taxes (increasing 
their net income and consumer spending) (see Section 5.3);
•	 Compensation of indirect carbon costs: for all scenarios, we have assumed that energy-intensive 
industries are not compensated for the ETS carbon costs passed through to the electricity prices for
industrial end-users;
•	 Use of offset credits: we have assumed that ETS sectors are not allowed to use CDM/JI credits to
cover their emissions;
•	 ETS coverage: in all scenarios, the coverage of the ETS up to 2030 is similar to the coverage of
the ETS during its third trading phase as specified in the EU ETS Directive of 2009, i.e. including
the power sector and energy-intensive industries such as iron and steel, refineries, paper and pulp, 
glass, bricks, cement, aluminium and some chemical installations. Moreover, in addition to the
CO2 emissions of these installations, the scenarios also include the other GHGs specified by the
2009 ETS Directive (European Commission, 2009). In all scenarios, however, aviation is excluded
from the coverage of the ETS.
•	 RES-E subsidy: in all relevant scenarios, RES-E subsidies are in place (but with different subsidy 
levels). They are defined as a percentage of difference between the average levelised cost (LCOE)
of RES-E generation and the current electricity price. Due to the model set-up with inertia related
to technology adoption, the percentage is larger than the actual relative difference between the
LCOE and the electricity price. Subsidies are funded through uniformly higher electricity prices
for households and industries;
4.2 Baseline scenario
The Baseline Scenario (S0) represents the business-as-usual case in which existing 2020 GHG and
RES policies – as well as other policies related to reducing energy consumption or improving energy 
efficiency – are maintained but not tightened. The EU region has been calibrated to the baseline
scenario of the so-called ‘PRIMES projections’, published by the European Commission (DG Energy)
in its EU energy trends to 2030 (European Commission, 2010b), while all other, non-EU regions have 
been calibrated to the baseline scenario of the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2012. For the EU, we
have used the 2009 update of the PRIMES projections, which are based on current EU and Member
States’ policies up to April 2009 and economic expectations by that time. PRIMES 2009 projections,
however, have been slightly further updated for this paper by including additional economic data for
2009-10, giving a better short-term representation of the recession. The PRIMES baseline projections
include the effects of the ETS and other current policies up to April 2009, notably policies in the fields
of energy savings, renewables and GHG reductions in non-ETS sectors. According to these
projections, the 2020 target is met for the EU ETS – more or less by definition by assuming
compliance to the cap – but not for these other fields of energy and climate policies (European 
Commission, 2010b).7 In this baseline scenario, ETS emissions are reduced by 27% (compared to
2005) to 1512 MtCO2 in 2030 (see also Table 1). The CO2 price increases from 4 €/tCO2 in 2015 to 8 
7 Besides the baseline scenario, the PRIMES 2009 projections also cover a so-called ‘reference scenario’ which
includes additional policies adopted between April 2009 and December 2009. This reference scenario assumes
that the two binding EU targets for 2020 will be met (i.e. the 20% renewable energy target and the 20% GHG
reduction target). The results for the reference scenario turn out that only half of the third, non-binding target
will be achieved (i.e. 9.5%  rather than the target of 20% energy savings by 2020). For more details on the
PRIMES 2009 baseline and reference scenario projections, see European Commission (2010a).
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€/tCO2 in 2020 and 33 €/tCO2 in 2030 (see Figure 4).8 In this baseline scenario, the RES-E share
amounts to 26% in 2030. The average RES-E subsidy is 2.0 €/MWh.
Figure 4: ETS carbon price, 2015-2030
4.3 Policy Scenarios
In Scenario 1 (S1 – CO2/ETS only), only a GHG target is in place, which is to be attained by the EU
ETS. This scenario represents the reference line to assess subsequently to what extent an additional
RES target (either addressed by a tightened EU ETS, as in Scenario S2, or by an additional RES-E
support scheme, as in Scenario S3) produces additional benefits or costs. Compared to S0, this
scenario is implemented by reducing the emissions cap for the EU ETS to 1,136 MtCO2 in 2030, 
which corresponds to an emissions reduction in the ETS sector of 45% compared to 2005. According
to Knopf et al. (2013), this target corresponds to the median of a set of model scenarios if overall GHG
emissions in the EU are to be reduced by 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050 – as mandated by the EU “A 
roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050” (European Commission, 2011b). 
The resulting ETS carbon price increases from 8 €/tCO2 in 2015 to 19 €/tCO2 in 2020 and to 100 
€/tCO2 in 2030 (see Figure 4).9 In 2030, S1 results in a RES-E share of 32%. The average RES-E 
subsidy is 1.2 €/MWh. It is lower than in S0 because the electricity price increases (see below) and its 
difference to the LCOE of RES-E decreases in S1.
8 This price patterns conforms largely to the most recent PRIMES projection of the so-called ‘EU Reference 
Scenario 2013’, which gives an ETS carbon price of 5, 10 and 35 €/tCO2 in 2015, 2020 and 2030, respectively
(European Commission, 2013a).
9 The major reason why the ETS carbon price in 2015 and 2020 is higher in S1 (and the other policy scenarios)
than in the baseline – while the ETS cap in these years is similar in all scenarios – is that the assumed policy
changes up to 2030, and the resulting ETS carbon prices up to 2030, lead to different EUA banking patterns over
the years 2015-2020 and, therefore, to other CO2 price patterns over these years.
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In Scenario 2 (S2 – CO2+RES/ETS only), an additional, EU-wide RES-E target of 40% (i.e., this target 
is not differentiated by technology or Member State) is to be achieved by 2030. This target is also
taken from Knopf et al. (2013), and corresponds to the lower bound of RES-E targets of a set of model
scenarios. It is meant to be in line with the EU “Energy Roadmap” (European Commission, 2011a, 
2013b), according to which the RES share in primary gross final energy consumption has to be
increased to 30% to be on track for a RES share of at least 55% in 2050 (the Roadmap is not specific
on how these targets translate into electricity generation targets). The additional RES-E target is
assumed to be achieved by means of the ETS only. This scenario, as a reference case, allows us later
to specify the potential gains of a policy mix in a setting with two separate targets, as implemented in
Scenario S3. For this purpose, the ETS cap is reduced beyond the level in S1 to 626 MtCO2 in 2030, or
by 70% compared to 2005 emissions. The ETS carbon price rises up to 440 €/tCO2 (see Figure 4). 
Compared to S0 and S1, the average RES subsidy again slightly decreases to 0.2 €/MWh. As for S1,
this is again due to increasing electricity prices and decreasing differences between these prices and 
the LCOE of RES-E.
Scenario 3 (S3 – CO2+RES/policy mix) is similar to the previous scenario (S2) in that both an GHG
target of 1,136 MtCO2 for the ETS sector and the 40% RES-E target are to be attained simultaneously
in 2030. In contrast to S2, however, the two targets are to be achieved by a mix of two policy
instruments: the ETS and a technology-neutral feed-in subsidy (per kWh generated) for all RES-E
technologies in all Member States across the EU.10 In this scenario, the resulting level of the uniform
RES subsidy which is paid for each MWh of power fed into the grid (in addition to the wholesale
electricity price) amounts to approximately 18 €/MWh (in 2010 prices). It is introduced in 2014 and
kept constant in real terms up to 2030. This subsidy is implemented in our model by increasing the
reference LCOE value, on the basis of which the subsidy is calculated, over that assumed in S0, S1
and S2 (see above). The corresponding ETS carbon price is 53 €/t CO2 in 2030 (see Figure 4). It is
significantly lower than in S2 (because the RES-E target is not attained by means of the EU ETS but
by the additional subsidy), and also below the level in S1 (due to interaction effects between GHG and
RES-E policies).
By including Scenarios 2 and 3 and comparing them in parallel to Scenario 1 we aim to assess the
performance of a single ETS in comparison to a policy mix. ETS only approaches are often promoted
as the regulatory ideal for cost-effective sustainable climate and energy policy. We explore whether
this holds true in a setting with multiple market and policy failures next to a GHG externality.
5 Impact assessment
5.1 Macro-economic results
5.1.1 Aggregate results
Figure 5 presents macro-economic outcomes of the three policy scenarios by 2030 for the EU27 as a
whole (in % difference from the baseline). It shows that the difference in performance between the
baseline and policy scenarios – but also among the policy scenarios themselves – are generally small,
notably for variables such as GDP, investment or employment. For instance, GDP in 2030 is 0.3%
lower in S1 and S3, while the impact on employment is even smaller. For some other macro-economic
variables, however, the impact is somewhat larger. For instance, total EU27 imports of fossil fuels in
2030 decline by 5.2% in S2.
10 Note that, in modelling terms, this RES-E policy is exactly similar to setting an EU-wide RES-E quota (of
40% by 2030) with an EU-single green certificate trading system in which the certificate price is similar to the
uniform feed-in subsidy level
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Figure 5: Macro-economic outcomes by 2030 (in % difference from the baseline)
There are several reasons why the macro-economic outcomes of the three policy scenarios are
generally small. These reasons include:
•	 The outcomes refer to changes compared to the baseline scenario, i.e. they are relative changes 
induced by relative policy changes, in particular by policy induced changes in the ETS carbon 
price and, to a lesser extent (in S3), by changes in RES-E support levels. The changes in ETS
carbon prices by 2030 are relatively modest, ranging from 33 €/tCO2 in the baseline to 100 €/tCO2 
in S1. Only in S2, the carbon price is substantially higher, i.e. 440 €/tCO2. This scenario also
shows the relatively largest (negative) impact on macro-economic variables such as GDP, 
investment and employment (although even in this scenario this impact is smaller than 1%);
•	 Industry and the energy sectors account for a relatively small share of GDP, and this will be 
smaller still in 2030. In the baseline scenario, the services sectors are estimated to contribute 72% 
of gross value added in the EU in 2005, rising to 75% in 2030 (European Commission, 2010b);
•	 Energy-intensive sectors account for quite a small share of manufacturing output. The energy­
intensive sectors (chemicals, basic metals, construction materials, pulp and paper) represent a 
small share in total value added, i.e. 3.4% in 2005, declining to 2.7% in 2030. The share of the
non-energy-intensive industries is projected to remain around 13.5% throughout the period 2005­
2030 (European Commission, 2010b); 
•	 Even for the energy-intensive sectors, energy is often not a very large share of costs (at the 2-digit 
level energy costs are usually less than 5% of turnover for all sectors except power and aviation);
As noted, the impact of the policy scenarios on employment is generally even smaller than the impact
on GDP and investment. Basically, there are three reasons for this. First, this is due to the econometric
parameters describing the relationship between output and employment in our model. Because of
economies of scale and technological progress, changes in output are correlated with relatively smaller
changes in employment (the so-called Verdoorn-Kaldor’s law). Second, in the medium or long run, a
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negative impact on employment is mitigated by a downward adjustment of the wage rate, thereby
enhancing labour demand (employment) in the long run. Third, a higher ETS carbon price has a
(small) negative impact on GDP and, hence, also on employment. The negative impact on
employment, however, is mitigated by the fact that a higher ETS carbon price also implies that the
relative cost of energy versus labour become higher, resulting in a (small) substitution of energy by 
labour and, therefore, enhancing employment.11 
The scale of the macro-economic impacts is quite standard for this type of analysis. It should not be
interpreted as saying that there will not be substantial localized impacts – the second and third bullet
points above are saying that macro-economic impacts are small because a small number of
(sub)sectors/groups is affected, not that all (sub)sectors/groups are affected in a small way.12 
Moreover, in absolute terms, the difference in performance between the policy scenarios may be 
substantial. For instance, compared to the baseline, the decrease in GDP by 2030 amounts to about € 
30 billion in S3 and approximately € 120 billion in S2, i.e. an absolute difference of about € 90 billion 
between these two scenarios.
Comparing the three policy scenarios, Figure 5 shows that the performance in terms of GDP,
investment and employment is generally worst for scenario 2 (RES-E/ETS only) and best for scenario
3 (CO2 and RES-E). The major reason for this performance is the ETS carbon price up to 2030, which
is highest in S2 (rising to 440 €/tCO2 in 2030) and lowest in S3 (52 €/tCO2 in 2030). In terms of
imports and domestic supply of fossil fuels, however, the performance is best for S2 and worst for S3.
This relatively best performance for S2 can also be explained by the relatively highest ETS carbon
price in this scenario, which depresses economic activity and increases fossil energy costs, both
reducing fossil energy use, including imports and domestic supply of fossil fuels. Hence, between S2
and S3 there seems to be a trade-off between energy security and macroeconomic performance.
Figure 6 provides a slightly more detailed picture of changes in domestic supply and imports and
exports of fossil fuels under the policy scenarios in absolute terms (i.e. in billion €). Some major
observations from this figure include:
•	 In all policy scenarios, both EU imports and EU domestic supplies of fossil fuels decline in
absolute terms (compared to the baseline). In all cases, the decline in fossil fuel imports refers
predominantly to a decline in imports of oil/gas and, to a lesser extent, a decrease in imports of
coal. Domestic coal production is not affected in our model because by assumption changes in 
coal use are compensated by changes in coal imports first. While coal is generally imported from
politically more stable countries, this is not necessarily the case with oil/gas. This implies that all
policy scenarios result in some improvement in EU energy security in terms of reducing reliance 
on imports of oil/gas.13 
•	 As indicated above, the best performance in terms of improving energy security – i.e. of reducing
imports of fossil fuels, notably of oil/gas – is recorded for S2 (due to the high ETS carbon price of
this scenario). More specifically, in S2 EU imports of fossil fuels in 2030 decline by € 39 billion 
(i.e. -5.2%, compared to the baseline), consisting of a decline of EU imports of coal by € 6.1 
billion (-22%) and of oil/gas by € 33 billion (-4.6%).
11 In some cases (or in some sectors), the overall impact of a higher ETS carbon price on employment may even 
be (slightly) positive due to the positive labour-energy substitution effect. Moreover, depending on the
assumptions on the allocation of emission allowances (auctioning versus free allocation) and, in case of
auctioning, on the recycling of auction revenues, the overall impact of ETS carbon pricing policies may even be
positive on both GDP and employment (see Section 5.3).
12 See also Section 5.1.2, discussing some impacts at the sectoral level.
13 Note that in relative terms, i.e. as a percentage of total oil/gas imports in the baseline, the decline in oil/gas
imports by 2030 varies from -1.3% in S3 to -4.6% in S2.
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•	 A striking result is that the worst performance in terms of reducing imports of fossil fuels, notably
of oil/gas, is recorded for S3. Whereas imports of oil/gas decline by € 9.6 billion in S3 (i.e. -1.3%, 
compared to the baseline), they decrease by almost € 12 billion in S1 (-1.6%) and, as noted, by € 
33 billion in S2 (-4.6%). A major reason for the relatively higher imports of oil/gas in S3, in
particular compared to S1 and S2, is the lower ETS carbon price in S3.
Figure 6: Changes in EU imports and domestic supply of fossil fuels
5.1.2 Sectoral employment
Figure 7 shows the policy-induced changes in EU employment in some major EU sectors. In general,
these changes are negative and relatively small (i.e. in percentage terms), but occasionally substantial 
in absolute figures. For instance, in S2, employment in the sector utilities and mining declines by
171,000 units (i.e. 6%), compared to the baseline, while it increases by more than 180,000 units (i.e.
0.6%) in the manufacturing industries.
  
 
   
     
 
  
 
 
   
    
   
  
  
  
    
      
Sijm et al.: EU climate and energy policy beyond 2020 22
Figure 7: EU sectoral employment, 2030 (in absolute differences from the baseline)
In some cases, the changes in sectoral employment may be positive, whereas the change in sectoral
output is negative. For instance, in S2, output in manufacturing industries decrease by 1.4% whereas
employment increases by 0.6%. These opposite effects can be explained by the policy-induced 
increase in the ETS carbon price and the resulting increase in energy costs – notably of electricity –
which, on the one hand, leads to a loss of industrial output (due to a deterioration of industrial
competitiveness and economic activity) and, on the other hand, to a higher demand for labour (due to a
substitution of energy by labour and adjustments in wages).
5.2 Power sector results
5.2.1 Levelised costs of electricity
For each scenario, Table 3 presents both total and average levelised costs of electricity generation per
MWh (LCOE) in the EU27 by 2030 from a private sector perspective. 
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Table 3: Levelised cost of electricity (LCOE), private generator perspective, 2030
S1 S2 S3S0 (CO2/ (CO2+RES/ (CO2+RES/(Baseline) ETS only) ETS only) policy mix)
Total LCOE (in billion €, 2010 prices)
Total LCOE, excluding carbon costs and
RES-E subsidies 263.2 253.6 236.0 274,8
Total carbon costs 30.2 64.1 128.5 31,2
Total LCOE, including carbon costs 293.3 317.7 364.5 306,1
Total RES-E subsidies 7.9 4.5 0.5 27,0
Total LCOE, including carbon costs and
RES-E subsidies 285.5 313.2 364.0 279,1
Average LCOE (in €/MWh, 2010
prices)
Average LCOE, excluding carbon costs 
and RES-E subsidies
Average carbon costs
Average LCOE, including carbon costs
Average RES-E subsidies
Average LCOE, including carbon costs 
and RES-E subsidies
67.1
7.7
74.8
2.0
72.8
68.7
17.4
86.0
1.2
84.8
73.6
40.1
113.7
0.2
113.6
73,6
8,4
82,0
7,2
74,8
Some observations from Table 3 include:
•	 Excluding carbon costs and RES-E subsidies, total LCOE is lowest – € 275 billion – in S2, mainly
due to the relatively lowest electricity use in this scenario, and highest – € 319 billion – in S3, 
resulting largely from the more expensive RES-E technologies deployed in this scenario. Average 
LCOE, excluding carbon costs and RES-E subsidies is highest in S2 and S3 (74 €/MWh) but
lowest in the baseline (67 €/MWh).
•	 In the baseline the average LCOE, excluding both carbon costs and RES-E subsidies, amounts to 
67 €/MWh. In S1 (CO2/ETS only), it increases to 69 €/MWh and in S2 (RES-E/ETS only) even to
74 €/MWh. This increase in the average LCOE is due to the increase in the ETS carbon price by
2030, i.e. from 33 €/tCO2 in the baseline to 100 €/tCO2 in S1 and to 440 €/tCO2 in S2, resulting in
a substitution of more carbon-intensive technologies by less carbon-intensive, but more expensive
technologies (excluding carbon costs).14 
•	 In S3 (CO2 and RES-E), the average LCOE excluding carbon costs and RES-E subsidies increases
to 74 €/MWh in 2030, but this time the shift towards more expensive (RES-E) technologies results 
14	 Note, however, that the increase in the average LCOE may be mitigated to some extent by a counter-effect.
Due to the increase in the ETS carbon costs, the electricity price increases and, consequently, the demand
for electricity decreases. As a result, market equilibrium is obtained at a lower point of the power production
merit order and, hence, the increase in the average LCOE, excluding carbon costs, is mitigated.
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predominantly from the implementation of the RES-E support instrument as the increase in the 
ETS carbon price is relatively modest (and even smaller than in S1).
•	 Total carbon costs vary from € 30 billion in the baseline to almost € 130 billion in S2, i.e. on
average 8 €/MWh and 40 €/MWh, respectively. Total RES-E subsidies show an opposite pattern.
They range from € 0.5 billion in S2 to € 59 billion in S3, i.e. on average 0.16 €/MWh and  
€/MWh, respectively.15 
•	 From a private generator perspective, the increase in the average LCOE due to including the 
carbon costs is lowest (8 €/MWh) in the baseline (with an ETS carbon price of 33 €/tCO2) and 
highest (40 €/MWh) in S2 (with a carbon price of 440 €/tCO2).
•	 Similarly, the decrease in the average LCOE due to including the average RES-E support per
MWh is lowest (0-2 €/MWh) in the baseline and policy scenarios 1 and 2 (which include RES-E 
support policies introduced before April 2009) and highest (7.2 €/MWh) in S3 (where RES-E 
support levels are substantially increased to reach the 40% RES-E target by 2030).
•	 From the perspective of the private generator, total LCOE including carbon costs and RES-E 
subsidies vary from € 255 billion in S3 to € 364 billion in S2, i.e. on average 75 €/MWh and 114 
€/MWh, respectively. 
•	 Across all scenarios, total/average LCOE excluding carbon costs and RES-E subsidies are among
the highest in S3 (CO2 and RES-E). From a private generator perspective, however, they become 
lowest in this scenario when including both carbon costs and RES-E subsidies.
5.2.2 Electricity price for industrial end-users
Figure 8 presents the evolution of the average EU27 electricity price for industrial end-users over the
period 2015-2030.16 This price is based on the average levelised cost of generating electricity (LCOE),
including investment costs, fuel costs and other operational costs, as well as on the average power
transmission and distribution costs and the average tax level, including a surcharge to cover the costs
of the RES-E feed-in subsidies. Therefore, the electricity price for industrial end-users – as well as the
similar, but higher electricity price for households – includes the cost effects of the policies
implemented under scenarios 1 up to 3. 
Figure 8 shows that the electricity price for industrial end-users is lowest in the baseline, increasing
gradually (in real 2010 prices) from 120 €/MWh in 2015 to 186 €/MWh in 2030. On the other hand,
due to the pass-through of the carbon costs, the electricity price for industrial consumers is highest in
S2, rising steadily from 146 €/MWh in 2015 to 314 €/MWh in 2030. In scenarios 1 and 3 , the
industrial power price takes an intermediate position, i.e. between the baseline and S2.
15 Note that the average figures are expressed in terms of total power generation, including production from both
RES and non-RES. As, for instance, the share of RES-E in total generation is 40% in scenarios 2 and 3, the data 
for average RES-E subsidies in Table 3 have to be multiplied by a factor 2.5 to get the average RES-E subsidies
per MWh of RES-E generated (see Table 1).
16 A similar picture – showing similar trends and differences across the scenarios – can be shown for the
evolution of the average EU27 electricity price for households. Although the electricity price for households is
based on similar cost components as for industrial end-users (see main text), the average electricity price is about
50% higher for households than for industrial end-users due to higher transmission/distribution tariffs and higher
tax rates per MWh for households.
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Figure 8: EU27 electricity price for industrial end-users, including tax, 2015-2030
5.2.3 Changes in mix of power generation technologies
Figure 9 presents an overview of the major changes in the EU power generation mix by 2030 in the
three policy scenarios (in absolute differences, i.e. in changes of TWh output, compared to the
baseline). In each scenario, power generated from coal and gas (CCGT) is substantially reduced. For
instance, in S2 – with an ETS carbon price of 440 €/tCO2 – power from coal is reduced by more than
360 TWh, i.e. -81% compared to the baseline, while gas-fuelled generation decreases by more than
470 TWh (-53% compared to the baseline). The reduction in power from coal and gas, however, is
much smaller in S3 where the CO2 price is much lower than in S2 and where the 40% RES-E target is
predominantly achieved by an additional RES-E instrument rather than by the ETS only. For instance, 
in S3 power from coal is reduced by some 130 TWh (-29%) while gas-fuelled generation decreases by
304 TWh (-34%).
Compared to the baseline, nuclear output declines in all policy scenarios, except S1 (Figure 9). This is
due to the accumulation of two effects mentioned above, i.e. (i) the decline in total power demand in 
the policy scenarios (due to the policy-induced higher end-user electricity prices), and (ii) the increase
in RES-E output in the policy scenarios. As a result, the need for non-RES-E output – including
nuclear – declines substantially in all policy scenarios.
Note that the decline in nuclear output is lower in S2 than in S3, despite the higher decline in total 
power demand in S2. This is due to the fact that in S2 nuclear improves its competitive position 
compared to coal/gas resulting from the high ETS carbon price of this scenario (and, hence, the
reduced need for non-RES-E output is largely met by reducing coal/gas-fired generation), whereas the
RES-E support in S3 does not affect the competitive position of nuclear versus coal/gas (while the
positive impact of the ETS carbon price on nuclear is much lower in S3). In S1, the positive impact of
the ETS carbon price on nuclear is even larger than the cumulative, negative effects of the decline in
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total power demand and the increase in total RES-E supply, resulting in a small increase (7 TWh) of
nuclear output in S1.
Figure 9: 	 EU power generation by major technologies, 2030 (in absolute differences from the
baseline)
On the other hand, for each policy scenario – but particularly for S3 - Figure 9 shows a significant
increase in power from RES-E technologies such as wind, biomass and hydro. More specifically, 
RES-E output increases by almost 140 TWh (i.e. +13%) in S1, compared to the baseline, and by some
450 TWh in S3 (i.e. +44%). 
On balance, total electricity output declines in all policy scenarios, compared to the baseline, varying
from -230 TWh in S1 and S3 (-6%) to -720 TWh in S2 (-18%).
As noted, the 40% RES-E target by 2030 is achieved in both scenarios 2 and 3, although in different
ways:
•	 In Scenario 2, the RES-E target is achieved by means of the ETS only, i.e. by lowering the cap
and, hence, raising the ETS carbon price (up to 440 €/tCO2, compared to 33 €/tCO2 in the
baseline). As the carbon costs are passed through to end-users’ electricity prices, this results in a
significant decline of final electricity use (about 20%, compared to the baseline). Therefore, the
increase in the RES-E share from 26% in the baseline to 40% in S2 is for a substantial part (almost
half) achieved by reducing total electricity use (the denominator of the equation) and for the
remaining part by increasing RES-E production (the numerator). As the increase in carbon costs 
on fossil-fuelled generation – and the resulting increase in electricity prices – acts as a general,
uniform incentive improving the competitiveness of all RES-E technologies, only the less
expensive, (nearly) market competitive RES-E technologies – such as onshore wind, biomass or
hydro – benefit from this incentive. 
•	 In Scenario 3, the 40% RES-E target is obtained primarily by a feed-in subsidy, per MWh 
generated, which is uniform for all RES-E technologies regardless their pre-support cost level, and
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– to a lesser extent – by the ETS carbon price (i.e. 52 €/tCO2 by 2030, which is slightly higher
than in the baseline but substantially lower than in S2). Although the costs of the feed-in support
are passed through to end-users’ electricity prices (through a surcharge), in S3 these prices
increase much less than in S2 and, hence, final electricity use is reduced much less. Hence, the
total amount of RES-E production has to be increased much more in order to achieve the 40% 
RES-E target. Similar to the ETS carbon price, the uniform RES-E subsidy also acts as a general,
uniform incentive improving the competitiveness of all RES-E technologies in a uniform way.
Therefore, also in S3, only the less expensive, (nearly) market competitive RES-E technologies
benefit from the policy-induced incentives of this scenario (both RES-E and ETS).
Overall, the shares of coal and gas (CCGT) in the total EU generation mix decline in all policy
scenarios, but particularly in S2 (due to the high ETS carbon price in this scenario). For instance, the
share of coal declines to less than 3% in S2, compared to more than 11% in the baseline, while the
share of gas (CCGT) decreases from 23% in the baseline to 13% in S2.
The share of nuclear increases in S1 and S2, i.e. from 34% in the baseline to 36% in S1 and even to
39% in S2. In these two policy scenarios, all low-carbon technologies – including nuclear – benefit
from the increase in the ETS carbon price, while total electricity use declines. Yet, in scenario S2 the 
fuel switch from fossil to nuclear fuels is overcompensated by the overall reduction in electricity use,
such that nuclear generation declines in absolute terms. In scenario S3 the share of nuclear decreases
to 31%. In this policy scenario, only RES-E technologies benefit from the increase in RES-E support,
while total electricity use declines also in this scenario.
5.3 Sensitivity analyses
One of the major assumptions of the policy scenarios discussed above concerns the recycling of ETS
auction revenues (see Section 4.1) . More specifically, it is assumed that these revenues are recycled
through lump-sum allocations to households, which increase their wealth rather than their direct
consumption level. In order to assess the sensitivity of the model outcomes to this assumption, we 
have analysed the implications of an alternative assumption for two scenarios (S1 and S3), i.e. we
have assumed that half of the EUA auction revenues is recycled to households through lump-sum
allocations (increasing their wealth), and the other half through lowering their direct income taxes
(increasing their net income and consumer spending).
The results of the sensitivity analyses are presented in Figure 10 in terms of some major macro­
economic outcomes, where the labels S1 and S3 refer to the original scenarios 1 and 3, based on the
original assumption with regard to the recycling of ETS auction revenues, and the labels S1a and S3a
to the corresponding, alternative scenarios 1a and 3a, based on the alternative assumption regarding
revenue recycling.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis of some macro-economic outcomes, 2030 (in % difference from
the baseline)
Figure 10 shows that the differences in macro-economic outcomes between the original and the 
corresponding, alternative scenarios are usually rather small.17 In general, the outcomes are generally
slightly more favourable – i.e. less negative or more positive – for the alternative scenarios in terms of
GDP, investment and employment, while being less favourable in terms of consumer prices, EU 
imports of fossil fuels and EU domestic supply (use) of fossil fuels.18 This difference in outcomes can
be explained by the difference in the assumption regarding the recycling of ETS auction revenues,
where the alternative assumption leads to a lowering of direct income (from labour) taxes and an
increase in consumer spending, which on the one hand stimulates GDP, investment and employment,
but on the other hand enhances inflation as well as EU imports and EU use – including domestic
supply – of fossil fuels.
A major finding of Figure 10 is that the change in the model assumption on recycling ETS auction
revenues does not change the relative ranking of the scenarios in terms of the indicated macro­
economic outcomes. For instance, the performance of S3 and S3a is better compared to S1 and S1a,
respectively, in terms of GDP and investment, while being worse in terms of EU imports of fossil
fuels.
6 Discussion
Based on the results presented before, we now aim to discuss two questions with respect to the 
proposed EU climate and energy policy package up to 2030: (1) Does our model simulation suggest
implementing an additional RES target, or should the EU rather stick to a single GHG target? (2) If the
17 For the other model results discussed in the previous sections, the differences in outcomes between the
 
original and alternative scenarios are generally even smaller or even (nearly) absent.

18 In one case, i.e. GDP in S3 versus S3a, the modeling outcomes even show opposite signs, i.e. GDP in 2030 

declines by 0.17% in S3, compared to the baseline, whereas it increases by 0.16% in S3a (Figure 10).
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RES target is set, should it be addressed by an additional RES policy (i.e. a policy mix) or rather by 
the EU ETS alone according to the model results? To answer these questions, we compare the
performance of scenarios S2 (GHG+RES/ETS only) and S3 (GHG+RES/policy mix) in parallel to S1
(GHG/ETS only). We shed light on monetized benefits and costs as indicated by our model. In
addition, we address non-monetized results provided by our modelling exercise which can be
interpreted as additional benefits or costs. Table 4 provides an overview of the scenario comparison.
Table 4: Performance of policy scenarios S2 (GHG+RES/ETS only) and S3 (GHG+RES/policy
mix) compared to S1 (GHG/ETS only)
S2 S3
Impact variables (GHG+RES/ (GHG+RES/
ETS only) policy mix)
Increasing GDP – +
ed
ef
fe
ct
s Increasing investment – +
M
on
et
iz
Controlling consumer prices – 0
Controlling total LCOE incl. carbon costs and subsidies – +
Mitigating climate change Reducing ETS-GHG emissions
Reducing nuclear generation
+
+
0
++
Mitigating other
Reducing coal combustion + –
N
on
-m
on
et
iz
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
environmental Reducing oil/gas combustion ++ +
externalities Reducing domestic coal production
Reducing domestic oil/gas 
production
Mitigating security of Reducing coal imports
0
+
+
0
–
0
supply externalities Reducing oil/gas imports + –
Promoting employment – +
Legend:

++ strong positive impact (in case both policy scenarios produce positive impacts)
 
+ positive impact
 
0 no impact
 
– negative impact
6.1 Is an additional RES target economically reasonable?
Table 4 illustrates that neither of the two scenarios incorporating a RES target in addition to a GHG
target is strictly superior or inferior to a scenario with a GHG target only. Thus, our model results
neither affirm nor deny unambiguously that an additional RES target is economically reasonable. The
eventual decision needs to be taken by a multi-criteria assessment aggregating the diverse positive and
negative impacts. Particularly for the non-monetized effects, this would require attaching values to
impacts, which is beyond the scope of our study. Moreover, such analysis is by nature subjective and
therefore always dependent on the preferences of the decision-maker. Our results also show that the
impacts of an additional RES target crucially hinge on the policy instrument chosen to attain this target 
because the diverse benefits and costs are distributed unequally across the GHG+RES/ETS only (S2)
scenario and the GHG+RES/policy mix (S3) scenario. We outline this comparison in detail in the next
section.
These restrictions notwithstanding, our analysis also clearly indicates that an additional RES target
cannot be rejected a priori as welfare-decreasing if it is meant to address multiple market and policy
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failures (beyond GHG externalities). Notably, none of the monetized and non-monetized impacts
summarized in Table 4 is strictly negative for both policy scenarios including an additional RES
target. Moreover, some general statements, which appear to be robust across our policy scenarios, can
be made with respect to selected impacts.
First, implementing an additional RES target produces only minor macro-economic impacts (in terms
of changes in GDP, investment and employment), and these may be even positive. This is in contrast
to existing CGE studies which strictly predict macro-economic excess costs in such settings, even
though sometimes also only to a modest extent (Bernard and Vielle, 2009; Boeters and Koornneef,
2011; Böhringer et al., 2009a; Kretschmer et al., 2009). This difference can be explained by the basic
assumptions of our model: Policy interventions (no matter whether by EU ETS or RES-E subsidies)
may stimulate the use of unemployed resources in the economy, and may thereby lead to increases in
GDP, investment and employment. However, as changes in employment are generally small with an
additional RES target, our model does not confirm a strong green jobs hypothesis.
Second, there are some impacts which are positive in both the GHG+RES/ETS only (S2) and the 
GHG+RES/policy mix (S3) scenario, compared to the GHG/ETS only (S1) scenario. First, nuclear
generation is reduced in either case. Thus, our results suggest that implementing a RES target may
mitigate nuclear risks no matter by what type of instrument the target is actually attained. Similar
benefits of additional RES policies have also been shown in other studies (Jägemann et al., 2013; Möst 
and Fichtner, 2010). Likewise, oil- and gas-fuelled electricity generation – and thus presumably also
the externalities associated with the combustion of these fuels, such as air pollution, – are reduced
across the board.
6.2 Should an additional RES target be addressed by an additional RES instrument?
Attaining the RES target by the ETS only, instead of a separate RES-E subsidy, clearly impairs
welfare in terms of the monetized macro-economic impacts computed by our model. As has been
pointed out above, both the EU ETS and the RES-E subsidy may lead to economic growth in our
model compared to the reference scenarios because they may stimulate the use of unemployed
resources. However, this benefit is overcompensated in the GHG+RES/ETS only (S2) scenario by the 
depressing effect which excessively increasing carbon and power prices have on output, investment
and employment. The high carbon price also implies that this scenario performs worse than the 
GHG+RES/policy mix scenario in terms of power sector costs expressed by LCOE.
The policy scenario comparison yields ambiguous results when the non-monetized impacts are
considered. On the one hand, the GHG+RES/policy mix (S3) scenario brings about a stronger
reduction in nuclear generation, and thus of nuclear risks. This is because a technology-specific policy
such as a RES-subsidy is more effective in crowding out nuclear than a technology-neutral emissions 
policy, which favours emission-free nuclear just as RES-E technologies. On the other hand, the
GHG+RES/ETS only (S2) scenario brings about a significant additional reduction in GHG emissions.
Moreover, tightening the ETS cap to attain the RES target is more effective in reducing the
production, import and use of fossil fuels. Thus, if the eventual intuition behind the RES target is to 
mitigate environmental and energy security externalities produced by fossil-fuelled generation, a 
reduction of the EU ETS cap may generate more benefits than a corresponding RES subsidy. Thus, 
our study cannot reject the finding made in the European Commission’s (2014) assessment that an
additional RES target addressed by a supplementary RES-E subsidy may actually reduce pollution
control and health benefits. In our model, this observation can be explained by the fact that
supplementing the EU ETS by a RES subsidy reduces the carbon price. This results in a relative 
advantage of coal over gas. As a consequence, coal-fired generation is even higher in the
GHG+RES/policy mix (S3) scenario than in both the GHG/ETS only (S1) and the GHG+RES/ETS only
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(S2) scenario. This finding confirms the “green-serves-the-dirtiest” hypothesis by Böhringer and
Rosendahl (2010). Moreover, a reduced carbon price allows increasing emissions and fossil fuel use of
ETS participants outside the electricity sector as well as (mediated via commodity prices) in the non-
ETS sectors. This clarifies why imports of coal, gas and oil are higher in the GHG+RES/policy mix
(S3) scenario, and the RES-E subsidy does not reduce import dependencies.
These explanations reveal that when choosing a policy instrument to attain a RES target, decision­
makers face a trade-off between addressing non-monetary benefits more effectively and controlling
macro-economic and power sector costs. This trade-off also has important politico-economic
implications. Under the GHG+RES/ETS only (S2) scenario, carbon prices would rocket to €440 per
tonne of CO2 in 2030, compared to €50 per tonne under the GHG+RES/policy mix (S3) scenario.
Similarly, electricity prices for industrial end-users would increase by 50%. The GHG+RES/ETS only
(S2) scenario would therefore significantly impair the rents of industrial interest groups with a strong 
political weight. This makes the GHG+RES/ETS only (S2) scenario a policy option which most likely 
is not politically feasible – despite its potential benefits pointed out above. Against this background,
the policy mix approach may then be the only feasible approach to realize at least some of the welfare
gains beyond climate change mitigation. Eventually, the RES policy then also helps to enforce the
attainment of more ambitious GHG target politically, as has been pointed out analytically by Gawel et
al. (2014).
7 Conclusion
The European Council has proposed to stick to a more ambitious GHG target but to scrap a binding
RES target for the post-2020 period. This is in line with many existing assessments which demonstrate
that additional RES policies impair the cost-effectiveness of climate policies, and should therefore be
abolished. Our analysis shows that this reasoning may be flawed for a variety of reasons. First and
most importantly, we argue that attaining a RES target may produce benefits beyond climate change
mitigation if a second-best setting with multiple externalities related to fossil and nuclear power
generation and policy restrictions and imperfections is assumed. In this context, a RES policy may
help to address externalities for which first-best policy responses are not available. These 
economically relevant benefits have been typically neglected in economic studies so far. Our
quantitative analysis confirms that pursuing an ambitious RES target may mitigate nuclear risks and at
least partly also negative non-carbon externalities associated with the production, import and use of
fossil fuels. In addition, we demonstrate that an additional RES target does not necessarily impair
GDP and other macro-economic measures if rigid assumptions of purely rational behaviour of market
participants and perfect market clearing are relaxed. This balance may turn even more positive in the
long run beyond 2030 if RES-E costs are continuing to decline. Overall, our analysis thus
demonstrates that RES policies implemented in additional to GHG policies are not per se welfare 
decreasing. To the contrary, there are plausible settings in which an additional RES policy may 
outperform a single GHG/ETS strategy.
Our study also reveals that simplistic policy heuristics may not be helpful if multiple externalities are
to be addressed and policy choices are constrained. Neither a single EU ETS approach nor a policy
mix is by definition the best regulatory approach to promote sustainability in the energy sector. The
eventual decision on whether complementing a GHG policy by a RES policy makes sense can only be
taken after a careful investigation of the diverse benefits and costs pointed out in our paper.
Certainly, our analysis fails to assess the cost-benefit ratio of implementing an additional RES policy
in an unambiguous and quantitative manner. Yet, the same limitation would apply to studies pointing 
out the cost-effectiveness of a stand-alone ETS if these considered all impacts that are economically
relevant in a second-best setting. Thus, arguments to stick to a single ETS until the economic
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superiority of a policy mix strategy is proven cannot be convincing. Due to the fact that (i) policies
may have a multiplicity of impacts, (ii) the size of these impacts is subject to uncertainties, and (iii)
their valuation is contingent on individual preferences, an unambiguous, “objective” economic
assessment is impossible. Thus, the eventual decision on the optimal choice and design of climate and
energy policies can only be taken politically.
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